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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The order granting Respondents' Motion for Review to the Utah
Labor Commission Appeals Board is appealabli

tah Coin I ot Appeals

under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Appellants perfected the appeal by filing a
Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals within thirty days of the
Commission's Order. Exhibit 3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This case involves a dispute between the insurance carrier and the
heirs of Edward Esquivel, who was killed in an industrial accident. A f i« hit t
liability judgmt n( n :is >l>tainrtl in federal court, and the industrial insurance
carrier seeks to offset the entire net judgment without paying any portion of the
expenses of the action (attorneys' fees and costs), i r ;s>m
1.

1 >i< i the Commission err when it failed to make the insurance

carrier pay its fair share of the expense of obtaining a judgment against a third
party tortfeasor, and allowing the carrier a 100% offset ag*unst tuturr benefits?
a.

JUIU. the

Commission misinterpret Utah Code Ann.

§ 34A-2-106(5) as providing the carrier a "first right of reimbursement and offset"
which "takes precedence over flit" t/Ltniiaftt"". mint'si" mil is |\tul "first"?
2.

Does the proper formula for apportioning attorneys' fees and

costs between the injured person and the insurance carrier require use of the n£l
judgment as the economic iiitcicsi, ii hv appmuminl, siiuc (he rid judgment is
the only interest in which the parties share a common claim?
1

3.

If a third party tortfeasor pays a judgment, may the

Commission discount the carrier's future payment obligations to present value,
where the administrative rule reserves lump sum discounts for a "carrier" who pays
"a weekly benefit" early, under "order" of the Commission?
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The appropriate standard of appellate review in this case is "correction
of error." This case primarily involves the interpretation of a Utah statute, which
is a legal question. Where the issue involves questions of law, a reviewing court
will give no deference to an agency's determination since the appellate court has
"the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform
throughout the jurisdiction." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
An appellate court may grant relief if it determines that an agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law. Utah Code. Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)
(1988). In so doing, the court applies a "correction-of-error" standard in its
review of applicable statutory provisions. Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Commn, 811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991). Under such circumstances, a reviewing
court may grant relief only when an appellant has been substantially prejudiced
by an agency's erroneous application or interpretation of the law. AUred v. State
Retirement Board, 914P.2d 1172, 1174 (Utah App. 1996). Resolution of disputed
issues is not benefitted by the Commission's expertise or experience. Bennett v.
Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986).

2

Decisions construing provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act
are subject to heightened scrutiny. Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177,
182 (Utah 199

he Utah Supreme Court has specifically

effect to [purposes of t

-

"-it "to give

, uie Act should be liberally construed and applied

to provide coverage" and that "any doubt respecting the right of compensation
will be resolved in favor of the injured employee." State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial
Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984).
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are two possible applicable statutory sections, Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-106(5) (199 7

106(5)") and Utah Code Ann.

§ 35-1-62(5) (1994) ("Section 62"). Section 106(5) was part of a recodification
and revision of the worker's compensation laws at the time (lit t "(>m mission's
Order was enh'M d.1

n

)\\\\\u <w\\\w ntui the earlier Section 62 is the

appropriate statute, because the parties' rights accrued thereunder. However, both
statutes are virtually identical, so the outcome woul
which statute i-

* the same regardless of

i I Stvfiitn !«~1,,\ ] 06(5) is cited here, and Utah Code Ann.

§ 35-1-62(5) (1994) is attached as Exhibit 4.
SECTION 34A-2-106(5)
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be
disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5)(a) through (c).
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys'
fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately against the
1

There is case law support holding that adjudicated law at the time the judgment was
issued governs how the proceeds should be distributed. Prettyman v. Utah State Dept. of Finance,
496P.2d89, 91 (Utah 1972).

3

parties as their interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the
employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the dependents,
for any recovery had against the third party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be
reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs and attorneys'
fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a). for the payments made
as follows:
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in
the action against the third party if the combined
percentage of fault attributed to persons immune from
suit is determined to be less than 40% prior to any
reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2); or
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer in the action against
the third party if the combined percentage of fault
attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to
be 40% or more prior to any reallocation of fault under
Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the
employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or
satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the
person liable for compensation, (emphasis added)
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) (1997).
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
Edward Esquivel sustained a fatal fall through a roof arising out of an
industrial accident on April 26, 1993, at the Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah.
Esquivel sued the Freeport Center, settled the case, and arrived at a compromise
with the CNA Insurance Company, the employer's worker's compensation carrier
(hereafter, "CNA" or "the carrier"), to provide for a future reduction of benefits
to satisfy CNA's lien on the settlement proceeds. Thereafter, Esquivel's heirs
4

(widow, four children and elderly, dependent

*

!

;^ < \\ability

action against Gravely, Iiic, the manufacturer of a sweeping machine that Edward
was using at the time of his fatal accident. That case went to trial and resulted in
a judgment in favor of the 1 leli s ii t tl te ai r 101 11 i;t of $203, SO '

1 lit parties were

unable to agree on how much of the substantial attorneys fees and costs should
be "charged proportionally" to the carrier, as a credit against the carrier's right to
offset future liability b\ \\w iiiuminl «>f thr tiff (iidimirtit.
The heirs (appellants) filed an Application for Hearing to have an
administrative law judge of the industrial commission determine the proper
formula apportioning attorneys' fees am) a >o ^, * 1 »< I \ 1« tipplii ai ion 1 <» 1 he facts of
this case. The ALJ issued lengthy Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order on February 7, 1997. See Exhibit 2, Opinion of Judge Benjamin A. Sims.
On March * , \^{h , ihr insurant r 1 .unci hit t'l a Mutnni tur Review. The Appeals
Board of the Utah Labor Commission issued its decision denying the Motion for
Review on January 14, 1998. See Exhibit
Review was timel) * u r

:

1

...(>_

ihe Esquivels' Petitk

for

Exhibit 3.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1

On April 26, 1993, Edward Esquivel ("Edward"), the husband

andfather of Appellants (Esquncht ami son it I lent 1,1 w as, I illnll while working
as a roofer for Redd Roofing, Iiic. ("Redd") at the Freeport Center in Layton,
Utah. R. 1. Redd had assigned Edward to sweep old gravel from a warehouse
roof, using a Gravely sweeper. 1 Vlnl< muiu-m u m^ I In* sweeper near the corner of

5

a raised roof monitor, the handle grip came off, causing Edward to fall about thirty
feet, through the main roof, to his death. R. 2.
2.

Edward's heirs filed a wrongful death case against Gravely due

to the defective condition of the handgrip assembly. R. 163. In March, 1996, the
case was tried to a jury in federal court in Salt Lake City. The jury awarded total
damages of $814,228, but found Redd 50% at fault, Edward himself 25% at fault,
and Gravely 25% at fault. R. 165. Because of employer's immunity and Edward's
fault, the verdict was reduced and judgment entered by Judge Tena Campbell on
April 9, 1996 for $203,557. R. 27 and 165.
3.

CNA, Redd's carrier (R. 1.), began paying the statutorily-

required benefits to Edward's dependents in 1993. R. 161. In 1993, the heirs
filed a claim against Freeport Center for a defective roof, which was settled in
1994. The agreement liquidated CNA's lien to that point and reduced the benefit
to $205 per week. R. 13. The Freeport settlement is only significant because it
established the $205 weekly benefit which defines CNA's total "interest" for
purposes of determining its proportional share of attorneys' fees and costs.
4.

Attorneys' fees in the Gravely case were $81,402.90, with out-

of-pocket costs of $53,596.38, for a total case "expense" of $134,999.28. R. 167.
5.

The parties disagreed as to whether CNA was entitled to any

reimbursement and offset, after deducting CNA's proportionate share of attorneys'
fees and costs, pursuant to § 34A-2-106(5)(a). As a result, on or about April 1,
1996, CNA discontinued its weekly payments to dependents. To that point, CNA

6

had paid $21,320 2 to Esquivel's dependents (after the Freeport case). The ALJ
also found that the future value of payments owed was $126,602, for a total
carrier "interest" of $147,922. R I 06.
6.

Esquivels filed an Application for Hearing in order to restore

their weekly benefits and determine CNA's reimbursement and offset, if any, alt 11
deducting CNA's proportionate sitare of attorneys' fees and costs. R. 106.
7.

The Honorable Benjamin A. Sims ruled after a hearing that

CNA was responsible for 100% of the attorneys' fees and costs, and tl lerefore not
entitled to any reinihui st iilent or oiibcu Exhibit 2; R. 167. The heirs would thus
retain the entire net judgment of $68,507, with no future offsets. R 168.
. 8.
for review

The Labor Commission's Appeals Board grant ed I !N A\ m< >l i< HI
iyyo. See Exhibit 1. Although the Board held that

CNA's proportionate share of fees and costs was 100% (R. 264), it made no
assessment against CNA for this "expense" o*
CNA

that

1 priority first rig!it to reimbursement and offset which took precedence

over any assessment of fees and costs to CNA. R. 265. The Board thus offset the
heirs' entire net judgment against futi 11
: e bei 1 e fi t s

A

dditionally, the Board gave

the carrier yet m additional future offset of about $15,000 because it deemed
Gravely's payment of the judgment as the equivalent of CNA paying a lump sum,
entitling it to a discount to fncsi• 111 1 a 111 ^ I' '" 1" • I

2

CNA ultimately waived reimbursement of that sum in its Motion for Review. R. 176
and 243.

7

SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T S
The fair share doctrine requires that the employer or his insurance
carrier3 pay its fair share of the attorneys' fees and costs which were necessary to
produce the third party judgment or settlement. The applicable statute provides
that the carrier's share of attorneys' fees and costs be "charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests may appear" and are a "credit" to the injured
employee. § 34A-2-106(5)(a). Utah case law affirms that a carrier's proportionate
share of attorney's fees and costs be determined first, and credited to the injured
person as priority, before any reimbursement or offset to the carrier.
The net judgment is the only money in which the carrier and injured
person share a common economic "interest." Since neither the injured person nor
the carrier have any "interest" in the attorneys' fees and costs paid to the attorney,
the "net judgment," after deducting these fees and costs, becomes the basis for
charging the parties "proportionately... as their interests may appear." Thus, the
net judgment is the denominator in the mathematical formula to determine the
parties' proportionate share of attorneys' fees. The "interest" of the carrier is the
sum of past benefits paid plus future benefits owed, which is then divided by the
net judgment to arrive at the carrier's proportionate share of fees and costs. When
this formula is applied in this case, no reimbursement or offset is due the carrier.

3

Workers compensation law provides an identity of interest between the employer and
the carrier. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2) (1997). This combined interest is referred to
herein as that of "the carrier."

8

The formula for apportioning attorneys' fees and costs suggested by
the appellants is firmly grounded in a fair reading of unequivocal statutory
language and Supreme Court precedent, easy to understand and apply and fair to
all parties. CNA's unprecedented proposal ignores important statutory language
and is contrary to explicit Utah Supreme Court cases. If CNA's proposal were
adopted, it would, in the future, result in gross oppression of injured workers and
of widows and children of workers killed in job-related accidents.
Lastly, the Commission erroneously applied lump sum rules to give
the carrier a present value "discount rate," resulting in the offset of an additional
$15,000 of future benefits. This action is contrary to law because the money
came from a judgment, and not a "lump sum" paid "early" by the carrier, pursuant
to "order" of the Commission. This imposes yet an additional unjustified burden
upon the widow and children of the decedent which is not sanctioned by statute
or case precedents. It would work a substantial and grave injustice on all future
claimants where future benefits are owed.

9

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
CNA Must Pay Its Fair Share
THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO
COMPEL THE INSURANCE CARRIER TO PAY ITS FAIR
SHARE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS IN OBTAINING
THE THIRD PARTY JUDGMENT, AS REQUIRED BY UTAH
CODE ANN. §34A-2-106(5)(a). THE COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED THE STATUTE AS GRANTING THE
CARRIER A PRIORITY RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT.
A.

Introduction.

The issue of apportionment of attorneys' fees and costs between the
injured worker and the carrier has engendered considerable controversy and
confusion over the years. The issue is of enormous importance to injured workers
as well as insurance carriers. No Utah case has articulated a clearly-expressed
formula, consistent with the statute, which can be easily and fairly applied in all
future cases. The formula commonly used by practitioners and judges in this area,
a one-third reduction in the lien, has absolutely no statutory basis, and results in
windfalls to the carrier.

CNA's suggested formula is worse, providing no

apportionment of fees and costs whatsoever, with approximately a 122% offset of
the net third-party judgment.
The case sub judice clarifies this important but confusing area of the
law. The statute is understandable and a fair formula can be fashioned which
considers all statutory wording.

The formula proposed herein is easy to

understand and apply and is fair to all sides. It avoids the absurd unfairness of
10

situations where the applicant receives absolutely no benefit for the effort, cost
and risk of bringing a personal injury suit against a third-party wrongdoer.
B.

The Fair Share Doctrine.

Utah Supreme Court cases unanimously embrace the "fair share
doctrine," interpreting the predecessors to § 34A-2-106(5) as mandating that the
carrier pay its proportionate fair share of attorneys' fees and legal costs before it
may enjoy any of the benefits stemming from a plaintiffs third-party lawsuit.
Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967). "In a
substantial majority of states, when a third party suit is brought or recovery
effected by the employee, the employer or carrier is now obliged to pay a portion
of the attorney's fees out of his share." Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation § 74.32(a) at 14-138 (1995).
The Utah Supreme Court has commented on the "fair share"
philosophy inherent in the apportionment statute:
Where each of the parties has the right to bring the action and one
takes the initiative and obtains a recovery for the benefit of both, it
is only fair that each hear his share of the expenses necessarily
incurred in doing so. That this is the meaning intended in paragraph
[(a)] seems unmistakably clear, (emphasis added)
Worthen, 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967). "Charged proportionately" in the
statute means the carrier must necessarily pay its fair share of costs and fees for
producing those benefits to which it lays claim. The Utah Supreme Court has
condemned situations where a carrier has escaped such an apportionment:

11

Under the rulings made by the Industrial Commission in this case,
the plaintiff by her efforts caused an undeserved windfall to the
insurance carrier in that it was required to pay nothing whatsoever on
its obligation to the plaintiff — not even a proportional share of the
expenses incurred by the plaintiff for the carrier's benefit, (emphasis
added)
Graham v. Industrial Commission, 491 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 1971). See also
Prettyman v. Utah State Dept of Finance, 496 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 1972) (insurance
carrier required to bear its pro rata share of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in
obtaining settlement); and Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1973)
(legislature has plainly stated that a proportionate share of attorneys' fees and
costs must be deducted from insurer's share of the reimbursement). In Quinn v.
State, 539 P.2d 761, 765 (Calif. 1975), the California Supreme Court held that
"if the employer receives his fair share of the recovery, he must bear his fair share
of the cost of the recovery." (emphasis added) Justice Tobriner eloquently
expressed the injustice of failing to follow the fair share doctrine in these words:
An active litigant has, by bringing and winning this lawsuit, created
a fund upon which a nonparticipant in the litigation can draw in
order to relieve himself of a legal obligation he would otherwise bear;
the passive beneficiary thus necessarily benefits from plaintiffs efforts
in bringing suit. The employer has contributed neither time, effort,
nor money to the now-successful action; he thus seeks to enjoy the
benefits of the suit without contributing to its costs, (emphasis added;
footnotes omitted)
Quinn, 539 P.2d at 765. The carrier is thus obliged under § 106(5) to pay its
proportionate share of these expenses. Paying "nothing," as CNA did in this case,
is not an option.

12

Defendants argued below that allowing plaintiffs a credit for
defendants' proportionate share of costs and fees amounts to a "double recovery."
R. 243. The Quinn court debunked the double recovery argument:
To be sure, our interpretation will increase the plaintiffs present tort
recovery and decrease the employer's recoupment of past benefits,
but to characterize this result as an increase in compensation benefits
is to ignore reality. The fact that the employer must pay some portion
of his recoupment to the worker as a share of the attorney's fee does
not make this payment additional workers' compensation: the
employer's payment does not fulfill his obligation under the
compensation statute; it recompenses the [claimant's] attorney for his
services, (bracketed portion added)
Id. at 769. Apportionment of fees and costs is not double recovery for the heirs,
but simply insures that the carrier pay its fair share of the litigation expense.
C.

The Commission Misinterpreted § 34A-2-106(5) as Giving
the Carrier's Interest a Priority Over Apportionment of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

The Appeals Board Order (Exhibit 1) erroneously holds that the
carrier has a priority "first right of reimbursement" which "takes precedence over
the claimant's interest." R. 264. It reads:
In this regard, it is important to note that § 106(5)(b) and (c) grant
the first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier.
Because the statute requires that the employer's interest in the thirdparty award takes precedence over the claimants' interesty Redd
Roofing's share must be determined/^. The dependents' share will
then be limited to the amount of award that remains after Redd
Roofing's share has been deducted, (emphasis added)
Order Granting Motion for Review, R. 264. This is directly contrary to the
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Worthen, where the court faced the
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identical issue, based on a substantively identical statute. 426 P.2d at 223.
Worthen condemned the Commission's piecemeal reading of the statute, which
renders meaningless the part of the statute that says attorneys' fees are to be
charged proportionately against the parties as their interests appear:
The difficulty here confronted arises because if paragraphs (1) and (2)
[the equivalent of the current § 34A-2-106(5)(a)and (b)] above are
read separately and literally, each excluding consideration of the
other, they are in conflict. If the directive of (1) is followed, that the
expenses shall be charged against the parties as their interests appear,
then the directive of paragraph (2), that the insurer paying the
compensation "shall be reimbursed in full" cannot be complied with.
Conversely, if the insurer is "reimbursed in full," then it is not
charged its share of expenses as provided in paragraph (1). Where
there is such conflict in the provisions of statutes it is improper to
place all of the emphasis on either provision to the exclusion of the
other. They should be considered together and it is proper to examine
into the background and purpose as well as to the language of the
statute to discover what the legislative intent was as to which should
have priority, (emphasis added)4
Worthen, 426 P.2d at 225.
The Worthen court first addresses the underlying purpose of the
statute as an aid in its interpretation. "The basic purpose of this statute is . . .
making an equitable arrangement between an injured employee, and an insurer (or
employer) who pays him workers compensation . . . . " (emphasis added) Id. The
statute preserves a third-party action to the employee, but prevents double

4

It should be noted that the statute discussed in Worthen, denoted as Subsection (2), is
the precursor of § 34A-2-106(5)(h). The original language of Subsection (2) in 1967 was later
amended to add the even clearer language of the current Subsection (b) "reimbursed, less a
proportionate share of costs and attorney's fees provided for in Subsection (5) (a)." (emphasis
added)
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recovery by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. Worthen then articulates
Utah's version of the fair share doctrine:
Where each of the parties has the right to bring the action and one
takes the initiative and obtains a recovery for the benefit of both, it
is only fair that each bear his share of the expenses necessarily
incurred in doing so. That this is the meaning intended in paragraph
(1) [currently § 34A-2-106(5)(a)] seems unmistakably clear. . . . It
thus follows that Sec. (1), with unmistakable clarity[,] requires that
the expenses and attorney's fees be charged proportionately against
these "parties" (Worthen and the State Insurance Fund) as their
"interests" appear. It is more reasonable to assume that the
Legislature intended this application of the statute which comports
with its equitable purpose than one which would bring about a
contrary result, (emphasis and bracketed portions added;
parentheticals in original)
Id. at 225-26. Worthen then notes that "the sequence in which" the statute
"undertakes an allocation of funds" should be regarded "as having some
significance." (emphasis added) Id. The proper sequence involves determining
the allocation of attorneys' fees and costs "first," as a "priority," and
"reimbursement to the insurer is made from the funds remaining, and to the extent
possible . . . ." Id. at 226. This priority payment of the attorneys' fee credit to
the injured employee "before making the distribution of the funds" was upheld in
Graham, 491 P.2d at 224 (citing Worthen).
The Worthen court concluded that assigning a sequential priority to
the proportional allocation of attorneys' fees before reimbursement of the carrier
achieves "an equitable result in conformity with what we believe to be the overall
intent of the statute. . . ." Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. This interpretation was
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"more persuasive than the defendant's argument." Id. The carrier reimbursement
part of the statute is not to be "taken literally... to the exclusion of the preceding
paragraph which requires that the parties having an interest in the money
recovered have their proportionate share of the costs and attorneys' fees deducted
as provided in paragraph (1) before the remainder is allocated to them as provided
in paragraphs (2) and (3)." Id. Worthen has been cited repeatedly by subsequent
courts. See Graham, 491 P.2d at 224; Prettyman, 496 P.2d at 91; and Lanier, 508
P.2d at 39. Accordingly, the Commission's finding that § 106(5)(b) and (c)
"grant the first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier" which
"takes precedence over the claimant's interest" is clear error because it is contrary
to Supreme Court precedents.
The express language in the preface of § 106(5) specifically provides
that third party recoveries "shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections
(5)(a) through (c)." (emphasis added) Thus, the Commission erred by ignoring
Subsection (a)'s mandatory requirement that attorneys' fees and costs "shall be
. . . charged proportionately against the parties" as their interests may appear.
"Against the parties" includes the carrier. Therefore, the allocation and reduction
of the carrier's interest for attorneys' fees precedes reimbursement and offset by
the carrier. Worthen, 426 P.2d at 225-6.
D.

The Commission Made No Allocation of Attorneys' Fees
to the Insurance Carrier. Contrary to Statute and Case
Precedents.

The Commission's Order contains this arcane language:
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Because Redd Roofing's interest in the award is more than the net
amount of the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire interest in
the award. Consequently, all attorney's fees and costs must be
allocated to Redd Roofing, (emphasis added)
Order, R. 264. Ironically, this holding is correct, but inexplicably no allocation of
fees and costs is made to the carrier; they are all allocated against Esquivels:
The Appeals Board hereby concludes that Redd Roofing may offset
the sum of $68,507.97, which is the net amount recovered by the
dependents of Mr. Esquivel in their lawsuit . . . , against Redd
Roofing's future liability for workers' compensation benefits
otherwise payable to the dependents. After the amount of
$68.507.97 has been fully offset against such future benefits, Redd
Roofing must then resume payment of the periodic survivors' benefits
. . . . (emphasis added)
Order, R. 265. Thus, the full amount of the net judgment is offset to benefit the
carrier, with no attorneys' fees allocated to the employer, and no credit to the
employee for that allocation of attorneys' fees.
Under the Commission's decision, the carrier does not pay its "fair
share" of the attorneys' fees and costs; the Esquivels pay not only the entire
amount of the attorneys' fees and costs, but have their entire net judgment offset
against future workers compensation benefits. The Esquivels get nothing! This
is manifestly unjust and contrary to the letter and spirit of § 106(5). This
decision must be reversed and a proper allocation made.
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POINT II
Determining Carrier's Share and Employee's Credit
THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE REQUIRING THAT
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS BE "CHARGED
PROPORTIONATELY AGAINST THE PARTIES AS THEIR
INTERESTS MAY APPEAR" MEANS THAT EACH SIDE IS
ASSESSED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AS THEIR
INTERESTS RELATE TO THE NET TUDGMENT. THE
EMPLOYER'S SHARE OF THE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
COSTS IS A "CREDIT" TO THE INJURED PERSON AND
THUS REDUCES THE CARRIER'S REIMBURSEMENT AND
RIGHT TO OFFSET FOR FUTURE OBLIGATIONS.
A.

The Statutory Sequence Requires Allocation and Charging
of Attorneys' Fees and Costs First, as a Priority.

A determination of how the proceeds of plaintiffs' judgment should
be disbursed among the parties is not difficult. Section 34A-2-106(5) specifies the
correct order. This "sequence" has "significance." Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. The
three-step sequence for disbursement is:
1.

The attorneys'fees and costs are:
A.
Paid to the attorney. § 106(5)(a).
B.
Apportioned "against the parties as their interests may
appear," with injured person getting a "credit" for the
insurance carrier's share. § 106(5)(a).

2.

"Reimbursement" to the carrier for amounts
§ 106(5)(b).

3.

"Offset" of future benefits to the carrier (§ 106(5)(c)), after
deducting employee's "credit." § 106(5)(a).
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paid.

Worthen affirms that "the reasonable expense of the action, including
attorney's fees,"5 is a "priority" and is paid first:
If we do as the statute says and make the allocation provided for in
paragraph (I) first, that is, charging the recovery with costs and
attorney's fees in proportion to the interests of the parties, the
disbursement stated first is made first, and has priority over the
provision for the disbursement which follows it in paragraph (2) [the
equivalent of § 34A-2-106(5)(b)]. Then the reimbursement to the
insurer is made from the funds remaining, and to the extent possible
after the first requirement for disbursement is complied with,
(emphasis and bracketed portions added)
Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. Giving a senior priority to payment of attorneys' fees
and costs makes sense, since they cannot be apportioned, because only attorneys
may rightfully have an interest in their fees and legal costs. The ALJ echoes this
sentiment, stating "[an] attorney's interest in the judgment is in the fees and
costs." R. 166.
B.

The Net Judgment Is the Basis for Charging the Carrier's
Proportional Share of Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

The words "charged proportionately" in § 106(5) (a) can only mean
that the carrier and the applicant will each be required to pay a portion of these
attorneys' fees and costs. "Proportion" means "the relation of one part. . . to the
whole with respect to magnitude, quantity or degree . . . a portion or share of an
actual or implied whole having a size or value relative to other portions or shares

5

The word "expense" clearly means out-of-pocket costs of the action, as well as
attorneys' fees. Graham, 491 P.2d at 224.
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. . . ." (emphasis added) Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged,
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1986, p. 1819.
The Size of the "Pie." The statute clearly contemplates that the
"whole," for purposes of determining the carrier's "interest," must be the net
judgment (or settlement) because it is the only economic interest in which the
parties have a common claim. The parties are not dividing up the attorneys' fees;
they are dividing what remains after these fees are paid and that is the "net."
Thus, neither attorney's fees nor the gross judgment can define our "whole," or
"pie." What remains after the attorneys' fees and costs have been paid is the net
judgment.
Proper statutory interpretation, case precedent, logic and fundamental
fairness all dictate that the net. judgment (or settlement) is the only basis for
determining the parties' interests. We have already addressed the distribution
sequence embodied in § 106(5) (a) which requires, as its first step, that "[t]he
reasonable expense of the action, including attorney's fees, shall be paid . . . ."
Thus, the attorneys' fees and costs are gone, or taken from the pie, first. They are
not part of the "whole," which should be considered in step LB, i.e., determining
the proportionate share of the attorneys' fees and costs to be assessed. Further,
the word "and" appears right after the requirement that the attorneys' fees and
costs "shall be paid."

Only then, i.e., after the payment, do we find the

requirement that they be "charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear." Thus, the proportional charge will be applied to the nel
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judgment, because the attorneys' fees and costs have already been paid and are
gone from the pie. Lastly, § 106(5)(c) provides that the "balance" is paid to the
injured person to be offset against future carrier benefits.

Using that term

wouldn't make sense unless the statute first contemplates the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs in Subsection (a) in order to arrive at the net judgment.
Case Law Support. The allocation of attorneys' fees and costs is made
first, as a priority, before any consideration of reimbursement or offset to the
carrier. Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226; Graham, 491 P.2d at 224. The carrier will
have to pay its share, but it can only pay it share from the net judgment because
the fees and costs are already gone from the pie, as required by Worthen and
Graham.

The only two interests left to be considered in determining the

proportion are those of the injured party and the carrier, and they can only have
an interest in the net judgment, because that is all that is left after the attorneys'
interest is paid.
Logic. Simple logic dictates another reason why the net judgment
must be used. Mathematically, you can't get a true "proportion" using the gross
judgment, because the gross includes three interests (applicant, carrier and
attorney), but only two interests (applicant and carrier) are being allocated. This
simple example illustrates the logical inconsistency of using the gross judgment:

21

EXAMPLE NO. I
$330,000
$110,000
$10,000
$210,000

1

-

gross settlement/judgment
1/3 contingent attorneys' fee
expenses of litigation (costs)
net judgment
$90,000 - carrier's lien

Using the gross judgment, the carrier's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and
costs would be:
carrier's interest r$90.000>) = carrier's proportionate share = 27%
gross judgment ($330,000)
of fees and costs
The applicant's interest would be calculated as follows:
applicant's interest 6 f$120.000) = applicant's proportionate share = 36%
gross judgment
($330,000)
of fees and costs
The percentages of 27% and 36% don't equal a whole, and therefore it is not
possible to follow the statutory language and assess the attorneys' fees and costs
against the "parties" (only the carrier and applicant, under Worthen, 426 P.2d at
226) "proportionately."
Fairness. Using the gross judgment artificially kicks up the size of the
denominator, resulting in a lower proportion for the carrier, based upon the fiction
that the attorneys' fees and costs are part of the pie, when they are not. This
would result in the carrier always getting a substantial, inequitable discount.
Using the net judgment prevents this unfairness.

6

The applicant's interest is calculated by deducting the carrier's lien ($90,000) from the
net judgment ($210,000), because the injured person can have no interest in the attorneys' fees
or the carrier's interest.
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C.

Calculating the Parties' "Interest."

Once the denominator, or "pie," is determined, the rest of the
calculations are fairly simple. The statute, of course, recognizes that the attorneys'
fees and expenses have already been paid by the injured party. The task now
becomes deciding what proportion of those fees and expenses should be borne by
the carrier, and then applying that sum "to be a credit upon any fee payable by
the injured employee." § 106(5)(a). This credit must be applied against any
reimbursement or offset that would otherwise accrue to the carrier; otherwise, the
statutory language ("charged proportionately against the parties" and "credit")
becomes meaningless.
Illustration of Determining Interests. In Example No. 1 above, the
denominator is determined by making the obvious deductions:
$330,000
- $110,000
- $ 10 000
$210.000

- gross settlement/judgment
- 1/3 contingent attorneys'fees
- expenses of litigation (costs)
- net judgment (the "denominator")

The insurance carrier's "interest" is simply what the carrier has to pay, which
results in this share or proportion of the net judgment:
carrier's interest ($90r000^ = carrier's proportionate share = 43%
net judgment ($210,000)
The carrier's proportionate share of the fees and expenses, as its interest appears,
is simply a mathematical calculation of its proportion times the fees and expenses:
x

attorneys'fees and expenses
=
carrier's proportional share
carrier's proportional share of =
attorneys' fees & expenses
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$120,000
x
43%
$ 51.600

The injured person's share of the net judgment must be determined
by first deducting the carrier's lien, because the injured person can have no
interest in that lien:
net judgment ($210,000) — carrier's interest ($90,000) =
injured person's interest ($120,000)
The injured person's proportion is:
injured person's interest $120.000 = injured person's = 57%
net judgment
$210,000
proportional share
The injured person's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and costs is:
Attorneys' fees and costs ($120,000) x injured person's proportional interest
(57%) = injured person's share of attorneys' fees and costs = $68.400
Pursuant to § 106(5)(a), the injured person is therefore entitled to a "credit" from
the carrier in the amount of $51,600 toward the attorneys' fees and expenses
owed, and the injured person thus pays the balance of $68,400. Assuming the
attorneys' fees and expenses had already been paid to the attorney, the credit
would, as a practical matter, come in the form of a reduction of the carrier's
$90,000 lien in the amount of $51,600, leaving a net lien to the carrier of
$38.400 to be paid out of the net judgment.
Easy to Understand and Apply. It is evident that this formula is true
to the statute and case precedents, easy to understand and apply, and fair to all
parties. The formula follows the sequential outline of disbursements, precisely as
prescribed by § 106(5)(a)-(c), by first paying the attorney his/her $120,000. The
formula then determines the proportional shares of the carrier and injured party
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against the only real and substantive economic interest that remains, the net
judgment. The formula considers that the only true carrier's "interest" that
"appears" is the lien of $90,000, because that is what the carrier actually paid out.
The formula considers accurately and realistically the injured person's interest as
the net judgment minus the carrier's lien ($120,000). The injured person can
obviously have no more or less than this, because the injured party has no claim
on the attorneys' fees and expenses, and no claim on the carrier's lien.
As should be the case, these respective interests add up to a "whole,"
so that a true proportion can be determined. These proportional shares, expressed
in terms of percentages, can easily be applied mathematically to the attorneys' fees
and expenses to determine the dollar amount of each proportional share. It works
in every conceivable situation.
Fairness. The formula is fair to all sides. Assume for a moment that
the underlying facts in Example No. 1 were that the case involved a serious injury
(reflected by the $90,000 worker's compensation claim), and that the case
actually went to trial with strong contentions being made against liability and the
extent of damages. Assume also that expert witnesses (doctors and the like) were
called to support the injured person's case. Almost all personal injury lawyers take
cases on a contingent fee, but most also obligate the injured person to pay out-ofpocket costs ("expenses of the action"). Litigation is very stressful, and the injured
person (who may not even be back to work) has not only the stresses of his
normal life and the injury, but also those resulting from the pressure of litigation
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and trial. Let's suppose the trial takes five court days and the jury finally returns
a verdict of $330,000. There has been an incredible effort and sacrifice by the
injured person and his counsel to obtain this $330,000 verdict. The economic
cost of producing this verdict has been $120,000. The injured person's efforts
have brought a potential reimbursement to the carrier of $90,000, with absolutely
no effort or risk.
The carrier should pay a portion of the expense of the action. Yet,
under the Order of the Appeals Board, the carrier would pay absolutely nothing!
Under CNA's argument (R. 178), if the net judgment is sufficient to pay all or
part of CNA's future interest, then CNA gets a total offset for that amount; and
Esquivels pay all the attorneys' fees.
The proposal made by the Esquivels in this case, however, pierces the
illogical and anti-statutory unfairness of CNA's claims. It is requires that CNA
pay a realistic amount of the costs of the action before it tastes the benefits
thereof.

It requires a fair share payment by CNA based upon a realistic

assessment of the "pie" at stake, i.e., the net judgment/settlement, and not on
some unrealistic fiction that involves percentages based upon money paid to
somebody else (the attorney).
Because the formula suggested by Esquivels is correct, firmly founded
in proper statutory interpretation and relevant case law, and because it is fair, it
should be adopted by

is court.
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D.

Application of the Formula to the Facts of This Case.

"Hard cases make bad law," goes the old adage. Maxfield v. Sainsbwy,
172 P.2d 122, 131 (Utah 1946). Is the application of the formula in this case,
which results in no offset for the carrier, a harsh result that will lead to future
injustice? Or is it simply an aberration due to the unique facts of this case? It is
the latter. A unique confluence of facts, including relatively high attorneys' fees
and costs vis. the gross judgment, combined with the fact that this is a death case
with very young children involved, which draws the benefits out for many years,
produces an unusual, rare result. The carrier receives no offset, but this is just.
No one challenged the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees and costs
in this case, but a few comments are in order. The case engendered a very hard
fight by the product-liability defendant who "pulled out all the stops." The
Esquivels were required to retain two expensive, highly-trained, out-of-state
experts who provided important engineering and safety testimony. The defense
had multiple out-of-state experts and witnesses that were required to be deposed.
There were hundreds of pages of documents and exhibits to review, and many
liability depositions were taken. The attorneys contracted this case for a forty
percent fee if it went to trial.7 R. 20-23. As a result, out-of-pocket costs were

7

This fee was negotiated originally by Richard IC Nebeker, now deceased, who took the
case in. Sometime thereafter, he associated the firm of Sykes & Vilos for trial, but his original
fee agreement governed, which provided for a one-third fee if the case settled and 40% if the case
went to trial. Evidence was presented at the hearing that the attorneys had expended
approximately $220,000 worth of time to that point, for which they were actually compensated
just over $81,000. R. 22.
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$53,596, and attorneys' fees were $81,402.90, for a total case "expense" of
$134,999.28.

The unusually high case expense reduces the net judgment,

producing an unusually low "denominator" for purposes of the formula. It is
obvious that this is aberrational in nature since most underlying cases are not so
difficult, generally result in a one-third contingent fee, and aren't so expensive to
litigate.
Another unusual factor about this case is the fact that it is a death
case involving four young children, a fairly young widow and a totally-dependent
elderly mother. Accordingly, the benefits continue constant and undiminished
until the youngest child (age 3 at the time of Edward's death) reaches age 18 in
the year 2008. R. 158, R. 180. CNA was therefore looking at a future liability
of $126,602. Fact No. 5.
The net impact of these facts is that the carrier's interest ("the
numerator") is going to be very high, much higher than the huge majority of runof-the-mill cases not involving a death under these circumstances. The carrier's
interest will be 15 years of benefits from the date of the accident, compared
against a very low denominator (net judgment). This rarity was not unanticipated
by Worthen. In explaining the priority of "first" charging the carrier's fair share of
attorneys' fees and costs, the Court noted the second step:
Then the reimbursement to the insurer is made from the funds
remaining, and to the extent possible after the first requirement for
disbursement is complied with, (emphasis added)
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Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. "[T]o the extent possible" is an acknowledgment that
there will not be an insurer reimbursement in every case, because there may not
be money left over after the priority "disbursement [to the injured person] is
complied with."
The application of the formula to our facts shows the following:
EXAMPLE NO. 2
$203,507
$81,403
$53,596
$68,507
$147,922

••
••
••
••
••

gross judgment
40% contingent attorneys' fee
expenses of litigation (costs)
net judgment
carrier's lien ($21,320 past payment;
and $ 126,602 future benefits)

The carrier's proportionate share of attorneys' fees and costs is:
carrier's interest $147.923 = carrier's proportionate share = 100%
gross judgment $68,507
of fees and costs
The ALJ found that the carrier "is essentially entitled to 100% of the available
$68,507.25." R. 167. Since CNA has a claim for 100% of the net recovery, "it
must pay 100% of the attorneys fees and costs." R. 167. The ALJ found that
even though the above fraction would show a liability greater than 100%, since
CNA's interest cannot exceed the net judgment, its interest is reduced to the
amount of the net judgment. R. 166. The carrier's proportionate share of fees
and expenses, as its interest appears, is the following simple mathematical
calculation:
attorneys' fees and expenses ($134,999) x carrier's proportional share (100%)
= carrier's proportional share of attorneys' fees & expenses ($134,999)
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Since the carrier was 100% liable for the attorneys' fees and costs, the entire
amount of the net judgment, or the $68,507, becomes a "credit" to the heirs
against the $134,999 attorneys fees and costs the heirs had already paid.
This result is equitable to the carrier.

First of all, even the

Commission acknowledged the justice of allocating "all attorneys fees and costs
.. . to Redd Roofing." See Exhibit 1, page 3 of Commission's Order, R. 264. The
heirs took the entire risk of litigation for the potential of producing a windfall
reimbursement or offset to the carrier. The carrier did not participate in any of
the costs or risks of this litigation, but stood to gain everything if a large judgment
was entered in favor of the heirs. In fact, CNA came very close to actually
receiving substantial compensation for its lien. As noted in Fact No. 2 above, the
jury actually awarded $814,228 in damages, but found the employer and Edward
to be a total of 75% at fault, thus reducing the net judgment to the figure of
$203,557. However, assuming hypothetically that the jury had not found the
contributory fault by Redd and Edward, the application of the formula would have
produced a net offset to the carrier of $18,965. See Example No. 3, attached
hereto as Exhibit 5.
The carrier will undoubtedly press the argument that since it receives
nothing under the actual facts of this case, this somehow proves that the formula
is faulty. The contrary is true. The carrier receives nothing in this instance
because of the unusual facts and the vagaries of litigation, to which all litigants are
subject. The Esquivels surely would have loved to have had the entire $814,228
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judgment, but the jury saw the facts differently and deducted 75% from the
judgment.

In the last analysis, the jury's action is why CNA gets no

reimbursement or offset in this case.8 However, CNA had no direct risks in this
action. One of the indirect "risks" that any lien claimant has is that of a low
judgment or a no-cause. In the event of a no-cause, CNA would also recover
nothing. There is a continuum of risk from a no-cause on the low end to a large
judgment on the high end, which could result in a 100% reimbursement for CNA.
The closer the verdict gets to a no-cause, i.e., a low judgment, the more chance
that CNA will actually recover nothing, as in the facts of this case. However,
those are just the vagaries of litigation and CNA can hardly complain about the
result when it shared none of the costs or risks of taking this matter to trial.
Application of the formula in this case was imminently fair, albeit a
bit unusual. This is not a hard case, and it makes good law.
E.

Past "Sins" Revisited: Prior Formulas are Distinguishable.

Two questions need to be answered in this section: a) why don't past
Supreme Court cases apply the formula suggested by appellants? and b) what is
wrong with the common practice of simply deducting 1/3 of the carrier's lien as
the its proportionate share? There are good answers to both of these questions.

Because of the findings of 50% and 25% comparative negligence respectively against
Redd and Edward, the provisions of § 34A-2-106(5)(b)(i) and (ii) are triggered, which would
affect the analysis in this case somewhat. Since the employer is obviously immune from suit,
and had more than 40% fault, under Subsection (ii), CNA's reimbursement and offset would
be reduced by 50% due to Redd's immunity, plus another 25% due to Edward's immunity.
However, this reallocation was unnecessary since CNA bore 100% of the responsibility for
attorneys' fees and costs in any event. See the ALJ's discussion of this issue at R. 165-66.
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First, there is no indication that the analysis presented in this Brief
was ever presented to the Court. An appellate court should only be expected to
respond to the case that the attorneys bring it, and to address specific requests for
relief in the case.

It is not fair to expect appellate courts to undertake

independent, searching analysis which the parties have not first made.
Accordingly, any "inconsistent" formulas in prior decisions are confined to their
facts and not binding upon this Court.
Worthen illustrates why the application of the formulas in these cases
is limited. The injured employee received approximately $10,600 in worker's
compensation benefits. The underlying personal injury case settled for $60,000
on a 25% contingent fee. The injured person asked the State Insurance Fund to
bear its "share, i.e., one-fourth of its $10,667.44 reimbursement, for the benefit
of plaintiffs attorney for making such recovery." Worthen, 426 P.2d at 224. In
other words, the attorneys were suggesting the formula of a 25% reduction of the
carrier's claim because of the 25% contingent attorneys' fee. There is no analysis
of the basis for a one-fourth deduction of the carrier's lien, other than the obvious
relation to the contingent fee. The Court gave the injured person what he asked
for, a 1/4 credit on the lien Therefore, the Worthen formula is limited to the facts
of the case, since the court merely did what was asked.
The same thing happened in Prettyman v. Utah State Dept. of Finance,
supra. This was a wrongful death case which settled for $65,000 on a one-third
contingent fee. The carrier had apparently paid $6,000 in past benefits and owed
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another $19,000 in future benefits. Id. at 90. The carrier offered to pay one-third
of the $6,000 reimbursement, but refused to pay any part of the fees and costs of
the future monies owed. Id. The attorneys were only requesting that the court
order the carrier to "pay one-third ($6,415) of the $19,225 that it was required
to pay by the Industrial Commission award . . . " Id. The court did what the
applicant requested and ordered the carrier to pay its "pro-rata share" of the
$19,000 award. Id. at 91.
The traditional way of assessing the carrier attorneys' fees and costs
is to simply deduct one-third of the carrier's lien as a "fee" and credit that to the
injured person. The ALJ commented on this formula as follows:
With regard to the practice of the parties being charged a set
percentage or fraction of the fee at the conclusion of the trial, it is not
in accordance with the statute which requires the parties to
contribute or be given credit for fees and costs according to their
monetary interest in the case.
R. 167. In Example No. 1 above, with a $90,000 carrier lien, the traditional
approach leaves the carrier with a reimbursement or offset of $60,000 after
deducting a one-third "fee," or $30,000, as if the injured person's attorney had
also represented the carrier's interest. This approach, though common, totally
ignores the statute's requirement that the carrier's contributions to the fees and
costs be based upon its proportionate "interest." This means "their monetary
interest in the case." R. 167, 168. In other words, a flat percentage reduction of
the carrier's lien has nothing to do with the carrier's proportional monetary
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interest in the case (i.e., net judgment), which proportional interest will vary,
depending upon the net judgment. As noted by the ALJ:
It was evidently the intent of the legislature to require the party
obligated to pay workers' compensation to contribute the proportion
of the share of fees and costs representing the proportion of the
monetary interest that party has in the outcome of the case.
(emphasis added)
R. 168.

Obviously, simply deducting one-third of the carrier's lien as a

contribution to the carrier's share of attorneys' fees and costs is arbitrary and
unrelated to the carrier's actual monetary interest in the net judgment.
The main problem with the traditional "deduct one-third of the lien"
approach is that it is unfair to the injured person. This can easily be seen in
Example No. 1 above. The traditional approach leaves the carrier with a $60,000
claim to be reimbursed or offset against future benefits; however, the correct
reimbursement for the carrier, based upon the carrier's actual monetary interest
in the case, would be $38,400. This results in a $22,000 windfall to the carrier.
F.

The Breen Case from Nevada Supports Appellants.

The case of Breen v. Caesar's Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1986)
addresses the identical issue faced by the Court in this case. It adopted a formula
identical to the one suggested by Esquivels.
Breen was a banquet chef at Caesar's Palace when a stove exploded,
causing severe, non-fatal bums. He was admitted to the hospital, where he died
two days later. A malpractice action was filed against the treating physicians,
alleging that Breen's death was due to over-hydration. The employer's lien,
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though subject to some dispute in the case, was assumed to be $650,000 due
primarily to future pension benefits. Id. at 1071. Caesar's claimed its lien should
apply to the "total proceeds of any recovery from" a third party. Id. at 1072.
However, the court concluded "that Caesar's would be unjustly enriched if it were
permitted to assess its lien against the total proceeds of the settlement without
bearing its share of litigation expenses." Id. at 1074. The court noted that
Caesar's would thereby have obtained a substantial benefit almost extinguishing
its obligation, "at appellant's expense." Id. The court then set up the formula for
determining the proportional shares of the attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
Caesars share

=

tQt^1 ajnount of lien
settlement — (fees & costs)

Caesar's share

=

$650.000
$1,000,000 — $333,000

= 97.5%

The Breen denominator (settlement — fees and costs) is, of course, the net
settlement, i.e., $666,666. Id. That denominator is used to figure the appellant's
share also. Id. The court then multiplied the 97.5 percent carrier's share times
the litigation expenses, or $333,333, providing a net figure of the attorneys' fees
for which Caesar's was responsible of $325,000. Id.
A few years later, Breen was not only upheld but strongly endorsed in
Nevada Bell v. Hum, 774 P.2d 1002 (Nev. 1989). In Hum, two personal injury
claims settled for a total of $80,000. Id. at 1002. Total litigation expenses were
$27,658. Id. The district court apportioned the litigation expenses based upon
the net judgment, but Nevada Bell argued that the apportionment should proceed
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based upon the gross settlement. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected the
employer's arguments, upheld Breen, and validated using the net recovery as the
denominator:
This court then determined [in Breen] that fundamental fairness
requires that the insurer pay litigation expenses in the same
proportion as the insurer's lien recovery bears to the net
proceeds . . . . The injured employee may expend thousands of dollars
and recover little or nothing from the tortfeasor. The insurer risks no
additional expenditures, yet may recover the full amount it has paid
in benefits. The Breen formula encourages the injured employee to
seek a recovery for his injuries from the tortfeasor. Use of the
formulas developed in other jurisdictions could lead to the injured
employee[,] who risks losing substantial amounts of additional money,
receiving nothing even though a recovery is obtained. Such a result is
unfair to the employee and his family.
The Breen formula is
consistent with this court's policy of liberally construing worker's
compensation statutes to protect employees and their families,
(emphasis added; citations omitted)
Hum, 71A P.2d at 1003. The facts in Hum make for a good example:
EXAMPLE NO. 4

|

$80,000 ••
$27,658 ••
$52,342 ••
$24,901 ••

gross settlement
one-third contingent attorneys' fees
net judgment
carrier's lien

Nevada Bell's share of litigation expenses was calculated as follows:
$24.901
$52,342

= 47% x $27,658 = $12,999 (share of expenses)

It is equitable that the carrier in Hum pay $12,999 of the total attorneys' fees,
almost half, because its interest was almost half of the net settlement. Id. at 1002.
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G.

The Formula is Fair and Will Have Universal Application
to Future Cases.

The formula proposed in this Brief is absolutely fair for one main
reason: it bases the proportional allocations of the expenses of the action upon
the real economic interests in the case, that being the net settlement or judgment.
You can't divide or apportion what you don't have, or what someone else has.
The net judgment is the only thing in which the parties share a common interest.
Therefore, the net settlement has real economic substance, and it only makes
sense that that would be the basis of apportionment in allocation. With that
principle fixed, all future calculations of the parties' respective shares of attorneys'
fees will be fair, constant and easily-determined.
The beauty of this formula is its simplicity and ease of application.
One really need only know three easily-determinable numbers in order to apply
it: the gross settlement (or judgment), the amount of attorneys' fees and costs and
the carrier's lien. The calculations are purely mathematical and it will be hard to
make an error. Since the numbers are so easy to determine and the formula is
easy to follow, it will be self-executing and self-enforcing. The ALJs will love it.
It will easily and accurately guide the carriers, injured persons and the
Commission in all their dealings.
The formula additionally provides an important incentive for the
injured person to vindicate his/her rights against the third party, thus insuring
economic justice for both the injured person as well as the industrial insurance
carrier. CNA's proposal is an absolute disincentive, and will result in far fewer
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third party actions being brought and therefore, over time, less money in the
hands of both injured persons and their insurance carriers. With the proposed
formula firmly in place, the injured person knows that no matter what, assuming
a successful recovery against a third party, he or she will get something for the
effort. The injured person and his attorney, contemplating a third party action,
can anticipate some significant benefit as they scope out a strategy and do an
informal risk/benefit analysis. Knowing that they won't be "wiped out" by the
carrier's lien is a major factor in these considerations.
However, if CNA's position were to prevail, counsel would have to
inform the client, especially in cases where the lien is substantial, that there is a
significant chance that the client would get no net benefit from the third party
action. As the effect of the CNA formula becomes known, many injured persons
will simply say, "What's the use if the insurance carrier gets it all anyway."
Adopting the formula proposed by the Esquivels in this case would
end decades of confusion and injustice in this area of the law. It would enshrine
equity as the principle which guides allocation of attorneys' fees in third party
actions. The court should adopt the formula.
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POINT III
The Unfair "Discount"
THE COMMISSION'S REDUCTION OF FUTURE BENEFITS
TO PRESENT VALUE, USING AN EIGHT PERCENT
DISCOUNT RATE, IS CONTRARY TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE BECAUSE PAYMENT OF A THIRD PARTY
JUDGMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LUMP SUM
PAYMENT BY A CARRIER. IT IS OPPRESSIVE TO THE
WIDOW AND CHILDREN BECAUSE IT ALLOWS A 122%
OFFSET OF FUTURE BENEFITS.
A.

Plaintiffs' Recovery Is Neither a Lump-Sum Amount Nor
a Sum Paid By a Carrier Earlier Than Normal.

Utah Admin. Code R612-1-4 reads:
Eight percent shall be used for any discounting or present value
calculations. Lump sums ordered by the Commission of any permanent
partial benefit award . . . or of any other sum being paid earlier than
normally paid under a weekly benefit method shall be subject to the
8% discounting, (emphasis added)
The Commission erred when it relied on this Rule to enlarge the carrier's offset,
stating: "Pursuant to the Utah Labor Commission Rule R612-1-4, Redd Roofing
may determine the extent of its offset by using an 8% discount rate to [sic]
computing the present value of its future liability." R. 264. However, the Rule
specifies very limited instances where a present value discount is appropriate: (1)
where there is a lump-sum settlement ordered by the Commission or (2) where a
sum is paid by the carrier earlier than the sum would normally be paid.
R612-1-4. None of these conditions exist, so the Rule is not activated.
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This is not a "lump-sum" and it was not "ordered by the
Commission." To qualify as such a "lump-sum," stringent statutory requirements
must be met: "An administrative law judge, under special circumstances and when
the same is deemed advisable, may commute periodic benefits to one or more lumpsum payments." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421. The judgment cannot, therefore,
be a "lump sum" because there was no finding by the ALJ of "special
circumstances," and no commuting of "periodic benefits."

Further, the

Commission did not "order" the payment, and it did not come from the carrier;
it came from a judgment creditor, with no assistance from the carrier. CNA, in
fact, discontinued its payments to Esquivels on or about April 1, 1996. R. 161.
Consequently, any attempt to classify a third party judgment as a "lump-sum" will
be ineffectual in invoking provisions of the Rule.
CNA's argument is not supported by strained reference to "basic
principles of accounting." R. 180. Defendants' theory, that plaintiffs will take the
discounted "lump sum" and invest it at prevailing rates of interest so that the end
result will be the same as if the money was never discounted in the first place
(R. 182), flies in the face of well-established case law, as well as common sense.
See Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 193 P. 24 (Utah 1920). Injured
employees and their dependents should not be deemed to know and engage in
sophisticated economic conduct.
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B.

Neither § 34A-2-106(5) nor Case Law Provide for a
Present Value Computation,

Nowhere in the governing statute, § 34A-2-106(5), does it state that
a present value discount may be made in apportioning the proceeds of a plaintiffs
third party judgment. To the contrary, the statute unequivocally states that the
recovery "shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5) (a) through (c)"
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5).

Surely, if such a carrier discount were

contemplated, it would be referenced here. Further, there is no case support for
discounting the carrier's future obligation to plaintiffs.
C.

The Proposed Discount Further Allows the Carrier to
Escape Paying Its Proportionate Share of Attorneys' Fees
and Costs.

Allowing CNA to depreciate its future obligation by the 8% discount
gives the carrier a $15,000 windfall, for which it pays nothing in attorneys' fees
and costs. This further circumvents the statutory provisions of § 34A-2-106(5),
for the reasons explained in Point II.
The insurer's interest, first determined in § 106(5)(a) to be $68,507
(the net judgment), is now modified and illogically increased to $83,000, in
violation of the clear language of § 34A-2-106(5). R. 264-5.
Statutory analysis under § 34A-2-106(5) is seriously compromised by
the addition of an unwarranted future value deduction. Discounting for present
value not only muddies the waters, but circumvents provisions of the statute
which require that the parties' interests and proportionate share of attorneys' fees
and costs be determined and apportioned.
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D.

Oppressive to the Poor, the Injured, and Widows and
Children.

This present value calculation is an outrageous assault upon the
defenseless, particularly in death cases. Death cases involve huge amounts of
future benefits to be paid. The Appeals Board decision means that every third
party recovery in a death case will result in a substantial additional reduction of
future benefits, reduced to present value, to benefit the carrier. This money comes
right out of the hands of the worker's widow and children, and tends to further
impoverish those already rendered poor by the loss of their husband and father.
It would be lamentable for this Court to enshrine such an unfair, oppressive rule.

CONCLUSION
In Utah and the overwhelming majority of other states, insurance
carriers must pay their fair share of attorneys' fees and costs necessary to produce
a third party judgment. The Commission erred when it ruled that CNA was not
required to contribute to the expense of securing the judgment.
The calculation of the interests of the carrier and the injured person,
and the proportionate allocation of attorneys' fees between these interests,
involves first determining the net judgment (or settlement). The net judgment is
determined by subtracting the expense of the action (attorneys' fees and costs)
from the gross judgment. The net judgment is the only realistic economic interest
from which to allocate the expenses of the action, since it is the only amount in
which both the injured party and the carrier share a common interest.
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The formula proposed by the Esquivels in this case for determining
attorneys' fees and costs is firmly grounded on the governing statute and case law.
It is also logical, understandable and easy to apply in all situations. It is equitable
to the carrier and the injured party, and will never result in the carrier getting a
windfall by receiving 100% reimbursement or offset while contributing nothing
to the cost of obtaining the third-party judgment.
Under the unique facts of the Esquivel case, because of the high
amount of attorneys' fees and costs, the fairly low judgment, and the high amount
of the future obligations owed by the carrier, there is no carrier reimbursement or
offset. The Commission erred by finding a first priority reimbursement to the
carrier, where the first priority is actually determining and deducting the carrier's
proportionate share of the attorneys' fees and costs.
The Commission's reduction of the future obligation to present value
finds no support in the applicable statute, administrative rule, or in case law. It
is contrary to the intent of the statute. It would result in an oppressive and
inequitable deduction against the widows and children of deceased workers.
Dated this 18th day of May, 1998.

Attorney for Appellants
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62(5) (1994).
Example No. 3.

Tabl

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
DEPENDANTS OF EDWARD
ESQUIVEL (Deceased),
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Applicants,
*

v.
REDD ROOFING & COMPANY and
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

Case No. 96-0670
*

Redd Roofing & Company and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance
Company (referred to collectively as "Redd Roofing" hereafter) ask the Appeals Board of the Utah
Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Redd Roofing is not
entitled to any offset of its liability for benefits payable to the dependents of Edward Esquivel under
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act".)
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
May the proceeds of the Esquivel dependents' third party lawsuit be offset against Redd
Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits?
FINDINGS OF FACT
On April 26, 1993, Mr. Esquivel was killed in an accident while working for Redd Roofing.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Esquivel was using a roof sweeper manufactured by Gravely
International to clean the roof of a building owned by the Freeport Center. Redd Roofing accepted
liability for the dependents' benefits payable under the Act to Mr. Esquivel's children and spouse.
The dependents then commenced a negligence lawsuit against Gravely International.1

1

Prior to their lawsuit against Graveley International, the dependents also brought a
negligence lawsuit against the Freeport Center. The parties have previously agreed to the
disbursement of the proceeds from the Freeport Center lawsuit.
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On April 9, 1996, the dependents were awarded damages of $203,507.25 from Gravely
International. After deduction of attorneys fees and costs of $134,999.28, the dependents' net award
was $68,507.97.
Although Redd Roofing has waived its claim to reimbursement for dependents' benefits paid
prior to April 9, 1996, it continues to assert its right to offset the net amount of the dependent's third
party award against its liability for future dependents' benefits. As of April 9, 1996, the present value
of Redd Roofing's liability for such future benefits, computed at a discount rate of 8%, was $83,000.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Redd Roofing's right of offset against proceeds of the dependents' third party lawsuit is
governed by §34A-2-106(5) of the Act.2 Section 106(5)(a) provides the method for allocating the
costs and attorneys fees of the third party lawsuit between the dependents and Redd Roofing.
Section 106(5)(b) also establishes the formula for reimbursing Redd Roofing for dependents' benefits
already paid to the dependents. However, Redd Roofing has waived this right to reimbursement.
Finally, §106(5)(c) governs Redd Roofing's right to offset the dependents' third party award against
the future dependents' benefits that Red Roofing would otherwise be required to pay.

2

The full text of subsection 34A-2-106(5) is as follows:

(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be disbursed in accordance with
Subsections (5)(a) through (c).
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer
or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of death, by
the dependents, for any recovery had against the third party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys1 fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows:
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or employee
of the employer in the action against the third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% prior to any reallocation of fault under
Subsection 78-27-39(2); or
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to the
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the third party if the
combined percentage of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be 40% or
more prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death,
to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable
for compensation.
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I.

ALLOCATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES

Section 106(5)(a) requires that attorneys fees and costs incurred in third party lawsuits be
allocated between the dependents and the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier "as
their interests may appear." In this regard, it is important to note that §106(5)(b) and (c) grant the
first right of reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier. Because the statute requires that the
employer's interest in the third party award takes precedence over the claimants' interest, Redd
Roofing's share must be determined first. The dependents' share will then be limited to the amount
of the award that remains after Redd Roofing's share has been deducted. The allocation of attorneys'
fees and costs between the parties must reflect the foregoing division.
In this case, the amount of the third party judgment actually available for allocation is
$68,507.97, which represents the amount of the third party judgment after attorneys fees and costs
have been deducted. The present value of Redd Roofing's liability for future dependents' benefits,
to be offset by the third party award, is $83,000. Because Redd Roofing's interest in the award is
more than the net amount of the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire interest in the award.
Consequently, all attorneys fees and costs must be allocated to Redd Roofing.
II.

OFFSET AGAINST FUTURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS

Because Redd Roofing has waived any right to reimbursement under §106(5)(b) for
dependents' benefits already paid, Redd Roofing's only remaining claim is for use of the third party
award to offset Redd Roofing's future liability for dependents' benefits. This claim to offset is based
on§106(5)(c):
The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, or the employee's heirs in case of
death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing
against the person liable for compensation.
Under the facts of this case, the plain language of §106(5)(c) requires that the balance of the
dependent's third party award "be applied to reduce" Redd Roofing's liability for dependents' benefits
"thereafter accruing". In this case, Redd Roofing's future liability consists of weekly payments of
$205 to the dependents through the year 2008, at least. Consequently, Redd Roofing is entitled to
use the third party award to offset its obligation to make weekly payments to the dependents, until
such time as the award has been exhausted. Pursuant to the Utah Labor Commission's Rule R612-14, Redd Roofing may determine the extent of its offset by using an 8% discount rate to computing
the present value of its future liability.
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ORDER
The Appeals Board reverses the decision of the ALT in this matter and grants Redd Roofing's
motion for review. The Appeals Board hereby concludes that Redd Roofing may offset the sum of
$68, 507.97, which is the net amount recovered by the dependents of Mr. Esquivel in their lawsuit
against Gravely International, against Redd Roofing's future liability for workers' compensation
benefits otherwise payable to the dependents. After the amount of $68,507.97 has been fUlly offset
against such future benefits, Redd Roofing must then resume payment of the periodic survivors'
benefits otherwise provided by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. It is so ordered.
Dated this W day of January, 1998.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MATTING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review in the matter of
Dependants of Edward Esquivel, Case No.96-0670 was mailed first class postage prepaid this
/ r d a y of January, 1998, to the following:

EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased
(Dependants of)
2631 F AVENUE
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

CNA INSURANCE COMPANY
4500 CHERRYCREEK DR SOUTH STE 100
P O BOX 17369 TERMINAL ANNEX
DENVER COLORADO 80217-0369

ROBERT B.SYKES
JAMES D. VILOS
MATTHEW H. RATY
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.
311 SOUTH STATE STREET #240
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

REDD ROOFING COMPANY
P O BOX 1304
OGDEN, UTAH 84402

THEODORE E. KANELL
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C.
4 TRIAD CENTER SUITE 500
POST OFFICE BOX 2970
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-297-

RICHARD K. NEBEKER
2040 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
36 SOUTH STATE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

Sara Jensc
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission

oiders\96-0670
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
Case No. 96670
DEPENDENTS OP EDWARD ESQUIVEL,
deceased,
Petitioner,

*
*
*

FINDINGS OP FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
REDD ROOFING & COMPANY and
/or CNA INSURANCE CO.,
Respondents.

*
*
*
*
*

AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BEFORE:

The Honorable
Judge.

Benjamin A.

Sims,

Presiding Law

On July 10, 1996, the dependents of Edward Esquivel filed an
Application for Hearing contending that respondents had discontinued workers compensation payments on or about April 1, 1996, and
that no payments have been made since that time. The payments were
to have been $205 per week.
Briefly, the decedent, Edward Esquivel, sustained a fatal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment with respondent employer on April 26, 1993, at the
Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah when he fell off one roof and
fell through another roof to his death. The Application stated
that this case involved legal issues only, and that no medical
issues were involved. The respondents agree.
At the time of his death, Mr. Esquivel was earning $14.00 per
hour and was working 4 0 hours per week. He was married under the
common law and had four dependent children under the age of 18 at
the time of his injury, plus a dependent mother. A Compromise
Settlement of a Disputed Claim was entered into by the dependents
of the deceased, and Redd Roofing and CNA Insurance Companies on
March 2, 1994. The Agreement was approved by a administrative law
judge (law judge) of the Industrial Commission of Utah on March 7,
1994. The Compromise Settlement of Disputed Claim Order provided
that:
1) . . . The applicant shall pay defendants [hereafter
respondents] the lump sum of $8,2 63.84. This sum represents
payment in full of any lien or subrogation owing to CNA for
death and dependency benefits paid thus far. Respondents
acknowledge that there is no further claim for offsets, repayment, subrogation or the like, on any amounts paid for
benefits to this point.

EDWARD ESQUIVEL
ORDER
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2) The decedent's weekly compensation shall hereafter be $205
per week.
This figure is determined by multiplying the
maximum compensation rate at the time of the accident ($341)
by sixty percent. This shall be the weekly compensation rate
for determining all future benefits to which the surviving
applicants may be entitled.
3) The [respondents] shall pay all dependency benefits to the
surviving applicant pursuant to the Utah Code and applicable
Rules of the Industrial Commission, at the amount set forth in
paragraph two above, for as long as the applicants are
entitled to receive those benefits under the law and rules of
the Commission.
4)
The compensation
follows:

awarded hereunder shall be paid

as

a)
to Norma Esquivel, for herself, one-fifth of the
amount of the benefits of $205 per week.
b)
to Norma Esquivel, for and on behalf of the four
dependent children, and to be used for their support, the
sum of one-fifth of the weekly benefits for each child.
Norma Esquivel shall use those sums for the support of
the children.
c) to Ofelia Herrera, the dependent mother, no sum shall
be paid from these benefits at present because the
parties have agreed that Ofelia will take a significant
share of the third party settlement.
5)
Applicants understand
settlement.

that this is a full and final

6) Applicants understand that in accepting this settlement,
they are giving up the right to an administrative hearing at
the Industrial Commission in which an Administrative Law Judge
could give the applicants more money, less money, or no money.
7) Applicants' decision to settle this case is their own. No
one has placed any pressure on the applicants or have
influenced the applicants in this decision.
8)

No attorneys' fee is claimed or awarded.

9) It is the applicants desire that the Administrative Law
Judge approve this settlement.
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The Order was approved by Theodore Kanell as attorney for Redd
Roofing and CNA Insurance Company and Robert B. Sykes as attorney
for the applicants.
Respondents admit that there are only legal issues to be
resolved, but deny that the insurance carrier has illegally stopped
paying benefits due to the personal injury settlement. Specifically, the insurance carrier alleges that it has stopped making payments pursuant to the provisions of UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended).
The respondents assert that the petitioners have recovered
substantial sums of money from third party tort feasors and the
respondents state that they are relieved from paying further
benefits as allowed under UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) until the
petitioners show that they have utilized the third party tort
recovery money in paying for benefits that would be otherwise
receivable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
By way of a separate and affirmative defense, the respondents
state that the petitioners previously entered into a settlement
agreement where the petitioners finalized the settlement with the
third party tort feasor in 1994. This is the same settlement that
was previously discussed in this Order. Further, the settlement
agreement was prepared by petitioners and their attorneys. By the
express language of the settlement agreement, the settlement
agreement only settled issues up to that point in time.
Respondents assert that it was their intent that if the petitioners
recovered money from any third party tort feasors that the
petitioners would be bound by UCA §35-1-62 (1953 as amended).
In this case, the petitioners filed a lawsuit against a third
party tort feasor named Gravely International. Petitioners did not
tell respondents that they had filed. Petitioners claim that the
omission was inadvertent and certainly unintentional that the
respondents were not informed.
The case went to trial and
petitioners recovered a gross amount of $203,507.25. Respondents
claim that they are entitled to reimbursement of their lien for
payments since the first settlement and are further entitled to be
relieved of any further responsibility for future benefits pursuant
to the statute. Respondents ask that the Industrial Commission
determine how much of an offset shall be granted and make a further
determination as to when payments should be resumed, if at all.
UCA §35-1-62 (3)(a) (1953 as amended) states as follows:
. . . . Before proceeding against the third party, the injured
employee, or, in case of death, his heirs, shall give written
notice of the intention to the carrier and other
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person obligated for the compensation payments, to give the
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the
proceeding.
The settlement agreement previously discussed was filed
against another set of defendants, Freeport Center Associates, a
partnership, and Robert 0'Block and Gordon Olch, partners,
associated in a business in the common name and stock of such
company, James F. Hannan and John Does I through X, and was filed
under Civil Number 930900370 PI in the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County. This action was ultimately submitted to
nonbinding arbitration or mediation by retired Judge Collin Y.
Christensen. After hearing the evidence for several hours, Judge
Christensen found that the cause of the accident and the
petitioner's death were as follows:
Freeport Center - 40%
negligent; Redd Roofing, the employer - 40% negligent and Edward
Esquivel, the deceased - 20% negligent. The settled amount against
these defendants was $375,000. The liability of the Freeport
Center was noted in the settlement agreement to have been
vigorously contested. Petitioners' basis for liability was the
claim that Freeport Center, as land owner of the buildings on which
Redd Roofing, an independent contractor was working, should have
responsibility for the safety of Redd Roofing's workers. Based on
the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to compromise and
settle the matter on a full and final basis as follows:
a) The petitioners pay respondents the sum of $8,263.84.
This sum represents payment in full of any lien or subrogation
owning CNA for death or dependency. Respondents acknowledge
that there is no further claim for offset, re-payment,
subrogation or the like on any amounts paid for benefits to
this point.
b) The decedent's weekly compensation was noted to be $205
per week and this was determined to be the weekly compensation
rate determining all future benefits to which the surviving
petitioners may be entitled.
Respondents argue that subsequent or even during the period
this agreement was being negotiated the petitioners were planning
to sue Gravely International which was the maker of the machine
used to clean the roof of the Freeport Center building in question.
The petitioners deny this and indicate that the arguments show that
they were merely looking into the possibility of suit against
Gravely International.
The petitioners assert that respondents were informed of the
possibility of a third party action on the products liability
issue.
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As evidence for this the petitioners cite to the Compromise
and Settlement of a Disputed Claim between the same parties in the
instant hearing and the related Order of Approval which was
previously discussed. The exhibit which is part of that original
Compromise and Settlement Agreement shows a disbursement sheet with
$10,000 withheld as advanced cost for product liability litigation.
The footnote on that exhibit indicates that there will be an
investigation into the case and that if there is no reasonable
basis to pursue the case, the remaining monies will be disbursed to
the beneficiaries in the same proportions as paid out of the
settlement monies. Thus it appears that there was a possible third
party action that could take place and that the respondents were
informed about it at the time. However, it is also noted that none
of those representing the petitioners felt that there was any great
possibility of additional monies being obtained based on a theory
of product liability.
The petitioners assert that with regard to any amount received
from Gravely International, the 1994 settlement agreement, and the
letter dated March 15, 1994 from Kerry L. Chlarson to Mr. Theodore
Kanell, attorney for respondents in this case shows that " . . .
this check, along with a reduced workers7 compensation payment to
Norma Esquivel, completely and fully satisfies any subrogation your
client, CNA Insurance Company, may have had against any settlement
proceeds the Esquivels and Ofelia Herrera may have received from
the Freeport Center or may receive from any other third party.11
The federal jury did return a verdict in favor of the
Esquivels, finding total damages in the amount of $814,029.
However, the jury found Gravely International 25 percent at fault.
It apportioned 2 5 percent of the liability for the fall to Edward
Esquivel and 50 percent to Redd Roofing. Therefore, the Esquivels
were awarded a gross judgment of only 25 five percent of the total
damages or $203,507.25.
With regard to the issues of reimbursement, UCA §3 5-1-62
(5) (b) (ii) (1993 as amended) provides that the amount reimbursable
to the person liable for compensation benefits shall be reduced by
the percentage of fault attributable to "the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer. . . if the combined percentage
of fault attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be
forty percent or more."
In this case, the fault attributable to the employer was 50
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percent.
When Mr. Esquivel's fault as an employee is also
included, that would cause the total fault by which the amount
reimbursable to the insurance carrier to be reduced to 75 percent.
Thus, only 25 percent of the total amount the carrier is liable for
is to be reimbursed to the carrier. UCA §3 5-1-62 (1993 as amended)
paragraph five requires that, " . . . any recovery obtained against
a third person be disbursed as follows:
(a)
the reasonable
expense of the action, including attorneys fees, shall be paid and
charged proportionately against the parties as their interest may
appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a
credit upon any fee payable to the injured employee or, in the case
of death, to the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
At paragraph B, the statute says that the person liable for
compensation payments shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in subsection
(5)(a) as follows:
* * *

" (ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer,
agent, or employee of the employer in the action against the
third party if the combined percentage of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit is determined to be forty percent or
more prior to any allocation of fault under subsection 78-2739 (2)."
Since the employer had 50 percent fault attributed to him this
paragraph is applicable. CNA has paid $21,320 to the Esquivels in
workers7 compensation benefits since the Freeport Center dispute
was resolved until the day of judgment. CNA is required reasonably
to pay an additional $126,602 in benefits to the Esquivels. CNA is
responsible to pay future benefits based upon benefits being paid
until the youngest child reaches her eighteenth birthday. Prettyman
v. Utah Dept. of Finance, 496 P. 2d 89 (Utah) held that future
payments are included in calculating the interest of the
compensation carrier in a settlement or judgment against a third
party. Including all past, present, and future payments leaves a
total liability of workers compensation benefits for CNA in the
amount of $147,922, making the interest of or exposure to CNA in an
amount of $147,922.
Gravely International was determined by the Federal Court to
be 25 percent at fault. Based upon the statute, reducing the
reimbursement by the percentage of fault attributable to the
employer and his employees (75%), or others immune from suit, the
total amount of reimbursement payable to CNA would be $147,922
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CNA can have no more interest in the judgment received by the
Esquivels than the amount which CNA would have to pay out in
medical expenses, burial expenses, and death benefits. This amount
is $147,922. This is a ceiling on the amount to which CNA has an
interest.
CNA has an interest in the recovery or judgment and its
interest is more accurately stated to be in the net recovery and
not the gross. In other words, CNA's interest is not in the total
amount of $203,507.25, but is only in the net judgment which cannot
be more than $147,922 in any event, and in this case is $203,507.25
minus attorneys7 fees and costs. An attorneys' interest in the
judgment is in the fees and costs. CNA's interest is only the
remaining money after fees and costs have been paid as long as it
is less than the ceiling noted. CNA has no claim to the fees or
costs, in fact it has an obligation to contribute to those
expenses. Gross recovery, minus attorneys fees including costs,
equals net recovery.
The gross amount of recovery was $203,507.25.
The gross
amount minus $81,402.90 in attorneys' fees and $53,596.38 in costs
equals $68,507.97.
Therefore, CNA's interest is reduced to
$68,507.97. This amount is the amount which will be received by
the Esquivels after all expenses of trial. Certainly, CNA should
receive no credit for any amount greater than that received by the
Esquivels. If CNA were to receive credit for a greater amount than
$68,507.97, CNA would not be paying its proportionate share of the
expenses as its "interest may appear." With regard to the practice
of the parties being charged a set percentage or fraction of the
fee at the conclusion of the trial, it is not in accordance with
the statute which requires the parties to contribute or be given
credit for fees and costs according to their monetary interest in
the case.
In order to calculate CNA's proportionate share of fees, the
first item to be considered is CNA's interest. In this case, CNA
has an interest only in the net recovery since it is less than the
amount which has and will be paid by CNA. The net recovery amounts
to $68,507.25 which is the money available for reimbursement. CNA
is potentially entitled to 100 percent of the available $68,507.25.
Since CNA has a claim for 100 percent of the net recovery, it must
pay 100 percent of the attorneys' fees and costs. The amount of
attorneys' fees and costs is $134,999.28.
Since CNA's
proportionate share of fees and costs is $134,999.28, CNA's lien
must be reduced by that amount. The lien amount credited to CNA is
thus zero since the fees and costs were greatly in excess of the
net amount recovered. CNA is thus not given credit for any offset
or reimbursement. This formula is somewhat more complicated than
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simple, but improper formula used to compute proportionate shares
of fees and costs. It was evidently the intent of the legislature
to require the party obligated to pay workers' compensation to contribute the proportion of the share of fees and costs representing
the proportion of the monetary interest that party has in the
outcome of the case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Under UCA §35-1-62(5) (1993 as amended) , it is determined that
CNA's proportionate amount of costs and fees is $134,999.28 and
CNA's lien must be reduced by that amount. Since the total amount
of CNA's lien is only $68,507.97, CNA is not entitled to any
reimbursement from the third party action against Gravely
International.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Redd Roofing and or CNA Insurance
shall pay $205 per week, in accordance with the Compromise
Settlement of a Disputed Claim and Order of Approval dated March 7,
1994 with interest from April 2, 1996.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received by the Commission in writing within
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless so received, this
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In the
event a Motion for Review is timely received, the parties shall
have fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt by the Commission,
in which to file a written response with the Commission in
accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated.

Dated this

, 1997

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Tab 3

ROBERT B. SYKES (#3180)
JAMES D. VILOS (#3333)
MATTHEW H. RATY (#6635)
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
311 South State Street, #240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No. (801) 533-0222

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD ESQUIVEL, deceased,
NORMA ESQUIVEL, RICHARD
ESQLWEL, ANGEL ESQUIVEL,
EDICA ESQUIVEL and OFELIA
HERRERA,

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Petitioners,
Appeal No.:
REDD ROOFING &
CONSTRUCTION CO., and CNA
COMPANY,

Priority No. 7

Respondents.

Petitioners petition the Utah Court of Appeals as follows:
1.

For review of the final agency action taken by the Appeals Board of

the Utah Labor Commission in the above-entitled matter on January 14, 1998 wherein
Respondents' Motion for Review was granted and additional off-sets of benefits were
ordered because of a third-party judgment.

2.

A copy of the Labor Commission's Order is attached hereto as

Exhibit 1.
DATED this 13th day of February, 1998.
SYKES &VILOS

OBERT B. SYKES, At&tfrey for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION
FOR REVIEW was hand-delivered, this 13th day of February, 1998, to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Utah Labor Commission
160 South 300 East, Third Floor
P. O. Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq.
Hanson, Epperson & Wallace
4 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Ms. Norma Esquivel
2631 "F" Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62(5) (1994)
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it shall be disbursed
as follows:
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in
the case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the
third party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed,
less the proportionate share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for
in Subsection (5)(a), for the payments made as follows:
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to the employer,
officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the action
against the third party if the combined percentage of fault
attributed to persons immune from suit is determined to be less
than 40% prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection
78-27-39(2); or
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied by the
percentage of fault attributed to the employer, officer, agent, or
employee of the employer in the action against the third party
if the combined percentage of fault attributed to persons
immune from suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to
any reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation,
(emphasis added)

Tab 5

EXAMPLE NO. 3
$814,228 - gross settlement/judgment
- $325,691 - 40% contingent attorneys' fees
- $ 55 r 596 - expenses of litigation (costs)
$454.941 - net judgment (the "denominator")
I
$147,922 - carrier's lien
Under this hypothetical (assuming that the carrier's interest included both the
$21,320 it paid, but actually waived in this case, plus the additional $126,602
owed, for a total carrier interest of $147,922), the following would apply:
carrier's interest $147 r 922 = carrier's proportionate = 34%
net judgment $434,941
share
attorneys' fees and expenses ($379,287) x carrier's proportional share (34%)
= carrier's proportional share of attorneys' fees & expenses (^$128.957^
This $128,957 in fees and expenses would be a credit to the applicant, and the
carrier would still receive a substantial reimbursement calculated as follows:
$147,922 (carrier's interest)
— $128.957 r carrier's fair share of attorneys fees and costs^
$ 18 965 (net reimbursement - offset to carrier)
In the above hypothetical, one can easily see the justice in requiring a carrier to
bear 34% of the attorneys' fees and costs, since the carrier's interest is 34% of the
net judgment. Under the "traditional method" of simply deducting one-third of
the carrier's lien (see Point II.E.), the carrier would credit the applicant for only
$49,307 of attorneys' fees (i.e. one third of the lien), instead of the $128,000
credit it should be, resulting in a nearly $80,000 windfall for the carrier. Even
more outrageous, however, is the method employed by the Commission. The
carrier would be reimbursed or have an offset for the entire $147,122! This would

result in a $128,957 windfall for the carrier (after deducting the correct $18,965
to which it is entitled), for which it would pay about 12% of its interest while not
assuming any of the risks of litigation.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of APPELLANTS'
BRIEF were served upon all parties of record, at the addresses listed below, by
hand-delivery on this 18th day of May, 1998:
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq.
Stephen P. Horvat, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE
4 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone No. (801) 363-7611
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
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